The fighting in Korea is usually referred to as "the Forgotten War," a reference to how little of an impression it has made on the American historical consciousness. Outside of M*A*S*H*, the cultural markers of that War are non-existent.
But I would argue that America's involvement in the First World War has made even less of an impression. It resonated at the time, but the wrangles over Versailles, the League of Nations and repayment of loans issued by America soured the nation quickly.
It became the war America wanted to forget--and it must be admitted that our nation did a pretty good job of it.
The only Americans from the conflict who pierce the cloud of willful forgetting are Sergeant Alvin York, General John Pershing and, most poignantly, the Unknown Soldier.
Which is truly unfortunate, since it was, in terms of actual casualties per day of combat, America's bloodiest war.
In April 1917, the United States brought into modern, mechanized warfare a first class navy, the Browning automatic rifle, the Springfield M1903 and a flood-tide of enthusiastic fighting men.
To say that America was criminally-unprepared to fight in the Great War is an understatement.
And her officer corps' experience consisted of frontier policing, brief fighting in the Spanish-American War and the bloody counter-insurgency in the Philippines. The Army War College, an effort to systematically train officers along European General Staff lines, was not quite 16 years old when the War began.
And the process of promoting Army officers by merit instead of seniority was not quite 30 years old.
In the aftermath of the declaration of war on the Central Powers, America had to engage in a crash mobilization program, expanding an army from the low five figures to over four million by the end of the War.
Pershing became America's Generalissimo, which was helpful from the standpoint of administration and a steely determination to forge an American fighting force. But amongst his flaws were playing favorites, micromanagement, and being an at best indifferent tactician.
This would lead to a crisis in America's bloodiest campaign, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Pershing, retaining command of the First Army as well as being the overall American commander, was flatly-overwhelmed by the task. Small gains and large casualties were the result of the American assault on the formidable terrain. Exhausted, Pershing kicked himself upstairs and appointed Hunter Liggett to replace him.
Liggett was not a favorite of Pershing's, but the latter was smart enough to recognize the merits of the stocky, unassuming veteran. Despite some initial continuing micromanagement by Pershing, Liggett was able to reorganize and refit the exhausted First Army. He also ordered the air arm of the AEF to provide more close support and air cover for American attacks. After a two week breather, he out-generaled the German commander by finding a seam in the formidable defenses, enabling the First Army to outflank the Germans. From that day forward, the American armies were continually on the move, breaking out of the Argonne. At the time of the Armistice, American troops were a day's march away from cutting the major German rail line supplying the Kaiser's forces being rolled up by British and Commonwealth forces to the west.
In short, Hunter Liggett had won the first modern American military campaign. Decisively.
And except for a fort in California, he is almost entirely unknown.
Author Michael Shay attempts to remedy this historical injustice by composing the first biography of General Liggett, who died in 1935. For the most part, Shay's work is solid, with excellent attention to detail, showing a historian who slogged through the records and reports of the pre-modern U.S. Army. Liggett and his wife had no children, and his personal papers were either few or unpreserved after his devoted-but-impoverished widow died. Liggett's story is a very interesting one, as he began his career in an Army built mostly to police the Indian tribes of the West, and finished it after commanding a force of millions with tanks, airplanes, and poison gas. Shay outlines this slow military transformation, as civilian and military leaders alike recognized that the shortcomings of the U.S. Army were threatening to render it useless. He describes the end of the seniority promotion scheme, which was nothing short of idiotic, and the birth of the Army War College, which proved to be a useful training ground for army officers, even in its infancy.
Liggett comes across as a dutiful officer well-suited for a modernizing army. He devoted countless hours to study of modern military problems and techniques, and as an instructor at the War College insisted upon in-person visits to America's Civil War battlefields to better understand terrain and decision-making processes. Liggett also shows how far America's post-civil-war reconciliation had come by the 1890s: his handling of Georgia militia impressed the State's governor so much that the latter became a booster of the Pennsylvanian Liggett's career.
The book has three flaws. The first is not the author's fault, but the reality is Liggett's early career does not make for exciting reading. He had a knack (which frustrated him greatly) for missing out on combat operations until the Great War. So there are a lot citations to reports that read like most bureaucratic reports read. But the reports about his weight, which would dog him in WWI, are interesting--and tend to debunk the idea that he was obese.
Secondly, the book leaves too much useful detail in the footnotes which could have been made part of the text--e.g., mentioning Fort Hunter Liggett.
Finally, and most unfortunately, is that the depiction of the climactic Meuse-Argonne battle is curiously flat and under-detailed. Much more information should have been provided. As someone who is more familiar with the campaign, I understood what was going on. Someone coming new to the War would not be so lucky, and likely wonder what the fuss was about.
However, the post-war sunset years of Liggett's life are decently-covered. Not least of which is how Shay illustrates that large numbers of Americans wanted to forget the war. Starting with the Socialist city council members in his hometown, who brusquely refused a plaque honoring Liggett after his death.
I recommend the book despite the flaws. There is no other biography of this forgotten American. And it is definitely worth a read if one is interested in America's participation in the First World War, or even how the U.S. Army gradually became a modern military institution.
